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Th e material remains of the culture of late antiquity—the art, the texts—locate 
angels as exceptional creatures existing with and among human beings yet diff er-
ent from humanity in ways that expand and complicate the range of possibilities 
available to both species. Late ancient cultural products of all sorts conveyed the 
message that angels were special but also familiar. When a person attending a 
Christian ritual in late fourth-century Ravenna looked up, he saw the faces of 
human fi gures looking back at him from the mosaics on the walls of his church. He 
also saw the faces of angels, in form much like human beings but with additional 
appendages, wings, that were theirs alone. When a curious reader perused one of 
the many collections of stories about ascetic feats accomplished in Egypt that were 
produced in the fi ft h and the sixth century, he learned that angels oft en appeared 
in the company of ascetic practitioners, frequently there to help out by exercising 
abilities that no human being, even the most disciplined, could claim. So, when the 
modest monk Amoun of Nitria needed to ford a river but would not disrobe to do 
so, an angel appeared in order to carry him across, dry and dressed.1 Even the more 
pedestrian letters that survive from ascetic leaders support extraordinary expecta-
tions about how angels could act among human beings: when the head of an 
ascetic collective needed to know the nighttime activities in his community but 
loyalty and dignity required that he not pry, an angel appeared to reveal to him the 
secret practices taking place among monks in their cells at night.2 When a city 
dweller decided to go through the initiation that would prepare him to participate 
in the central ritual activities of his community, he was trained to see in his mind’s 
eye the angels who attended the service—spectators just like the human partici-
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118    Ellen Muehlberger
mystic studied the paths of others to learn how to gain entrance into the heavens, 
he came to understand that angels guarded the entrance to specifi c levels of heaven, 
their extraordinary divine status granting them the power to be guides to less 
adept, human travelers.4 In all these cases, readers of texts could infer how angels 
acted and on what motivations, learning from their inferences that angels were 
very much like the human beings with whom they mingled; and yet angels dis-
played novel characteristics. Th ose novel characteristics were oft en so closely 
aligned with unexpected events that occurred in late ancient texts—heavenly 
tours, miraculous actions—that a modern reader may be tempted to conclude that 
angels were simply narrative devices, employed in late ancient religious literature 
to mark the intractable problem surpassed or the divine made accessible.
Th at temptation could be amplifi ed by the fact that the majority of what we can 
retrieve of late ancient knowledge about angels is itself preserved in narrative 
form. Such sources as those that I have just listed were all rhetorical constructions 
in which angels acted as characters. Shortly put, they were stories or could be read 
as stories, their words establishing situations and landscapes in which angels 
appeared and acted. Late ancient thinkers rarely engaged questions about angels in 
any other rhetorical register besides narrative. Th ere was no industry of persuasive 
or polemical treatises aimed at establishing the nature of angels as there was an 
industry of persuasive or polemical treatises written to establish one or another 
understanding of the nature of God.5 In expository terms, angels were undertheo-
rized in late ancient culture, particularly when compared to other, highly theo-
rized divine beings like God but also when compared to other topics, such as the 
constitution of the human person or the proper exercise of a virtuous life. Th ough 
forensic philosophical methods were not frequently employed in late antiquity to 
explore the meaning and essence of the category “angel,” we can still imagine how 
late ancient people may have known angels otherwise than in the narrative form. 
Two possibilities that are attested from late antiquity are direct visionary experi-
ence and magical collaboration; yet the media through which we know about 
them limit the information that they deliver. For example, angels may have been 
known to appear directly to human beings, establishing contact and a certain level 
of intimate knowledge, but the late ancient sources that point to such experiences 
are already narrativized. Recorded in stories, whether in fi rst-person or third-per-
son voice, such experiences are not available for us to investigate in any other 
form. For a second example, angels may have been known to be conjurable through 
ritual practices undertaken by individuals; and indeed they appear frequently in 
the magical material that survives from late antiquity. Yet even these sources allow 
us scant perspective on how such angels may have been known to those who con-
jured them. Th e form in which their presence survives, the spell, was itself a type 
of narrative in waiting, a formula containing of the hope of future behavior by 
certain characters, linked to the establishment of certain conditions and proff ering 
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certain results. Th us the kinds of sources that could allow modern readers to 
explore other, nonnarrative ways of knowing angels in late antiquity—conjuring, 
deriving them logically, taking up bodily practices to induce their presence: these 
are things not accessible to us in the remains of late ancient culture in forms that 
convey the alternative ways of knowing that visionary experience or magic seems 
to indicate. And so the material by which we can investigate late ancient ways of 
knowing about angels comprises largely stories—texts that present angels in action 
among other agents, inaugurating new actions and responding to others’ activities.
Th e preponderance of narrative sources from late antiquity seems to limit our 
ability to reconstruct how and what late ancient people knew about angels (or 
truly, what any people in the past knew about subjects in their world). And indeed, 
even late ancient people recognized the insuffi  ciency of language to convey knowl-
edge of those beings that exist in the divine realm, angels included. But the fact 
that angels appear in narrative at all allows us to discern something blindingly 
important about late ancient knowing, about angels conceived as subjects and 
objects of knowledge, and about the way that we as moderns make sense of intel-
lectual cultures equipped with actors and categories of being not viable in our own 
culture. Among the insights that acceptance of the narrative nature of most late 
ancient sources delivers is this: such representatives suggest that interaction with 
humanity was possible for angels. Th ough many texts from the late ancient period 
recount interactions among divine beings, few are the texts that focus on angels’ 
interactions with each other.6 Instead, the relationship between angels and human-
ity is almost always on display; in the absence of philosophical treatises that defi ne 
it otherwise or narrative scenarios that off er an alternative, such a fact suggests 
that interaction with humanity was the angels’ primary mode of action.
Th is chapter explores the parameters and consequences of that relationship, 
seeking to illuminate how late ancient assumptions about angels fostered particu-
lar cultural perspectives and products among human beings. My argument 
explores late ancient knowledge of angels and our estimation of it in two parts. In 
the fi rst, I demonstrate that the presence of angels in narrative reveals that they 
had the capacity to communicate with humanity, an observation that on its face 
seems simple but in fact leads to several complex realities about both species. Late 
ancient thinkers, in ways both explicit and implicit, followed the potential for 
communication to rarifi ed logical ends. Th ey understood angels to share a com-
mon psychology with humanity yet held them to be a diff erent class of being, with 
natures and motivations oft en beyond human understanding. Angels were not 
precisely the same as human beings, but they were familiar to them. Th e best way 
to conceptualize this relationship is to say that for late ancient Christians, angels 
were in the same ontological circle as human beings. As I explain, an ontological 
circle is a shift ing cultural construction that can comprise members of diff erent 
species but one wherein all members possess the potential for real contact with 
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120    Ellen Muehlberger
each other and thus for consequential communication, resulting in positive or 
negative outcomes. In the second part, I describe the consequences of the late 
ancient disposition of imagining angels as members of the same ontological circle 
as human beings. Although angels do illumine possibilities and limitations for 
humanity, they are far more than just tools “to think with,” as an oft -adopted schol-
arly phrase would have it. Instead, they occupy a place of potential and, as mes-
sengers, bring new ethical models to humanity. Knowledge of angels in late antiq-
uity, and contact with them, produced and reproduced cultural forms that 
ultimately changed ways of being human in that they introduced new forms of 
moral life and religious devotion.
THE ONTOLO GICAL CIRCLE
In the fourth and fi ft h centuries, both Christian and non-Christian writers partici-
pated in a trend of philosophical thought that removed God, the highest divine 
being, from similarity with the material world and any beings associated with it. 
Whereas intellectuals infl uenced by Platonic traditions had long assumed a divi-
sion between what was material and what was immaterial, and followed that 
assumption by locating the divine in the immaterial, late ancient thought experi-
ments redefi ned the highest divinity as even more remote from the material world. 
For although many ancient ideas about the immateriality of the highest god 
included a corollary assumption about limited contact with the world, God appear-
ing to a few select human beings in only a handful of situations, late ancient phi-
losophers pushed the highest god out of the realm of incomprehensibility toward 
the truly alien. At the start of the fi ft h century, for example, the Christian writer 
Augustine argued that it was inaccurate to think that God, the highest divinity, had 
appeared to human beings in material form throughout history. For him, Christian 
writings, especially the Epistles of Paul the Apostle, described a single moment 
when God chose to interact with humanity in one particular form, by sending the 
incarnate Christ. Th e incarnation was so defi nitive for Augustine that he vacated 
centuries of Christian reading practice to declare that God, the highest god, had 
not appeared in the material realm before the birth of Jesus—this despite numer-
ous descriptions of God interacting with humanity in the books Augustine held to 
be sacred scripture, especially the books of the Old Testament. Similarly, for the 
philosopher Proclus, active in the latter half of the fi ft h century, it was not just inac-
curate but inadequate to think, as had previous philosophers, that the highest 
divinity could be described even as a separate being, a god who existed in the realm 
of the immaterial and who communicated with the world through words or ideas. 
Instead, the highest divinity was so far beyond the human capacity to understand 
that it was necessary for Proclus to make a concession to the limited nature of the 
human mind. He advised that those seeking to understand the highest god should 
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Angel    121
conceive, as best a human being could, a One residing “beyond being” and thus 
beyond any contact with (however far removed from) the material realm, charac-
terized by multiplicity, decline, and the lack of the Good.7 For both Augustine and 
Proclus, developments in the qualities by which they defi ned the divine world had 
pushed them to conclude that God was irretrievably separate, essentially unable to 
be in contact or communicate with the world, because of the dissonance existing 
between his unity and the world’s multiplicity. Th ey both felt so strongly about the 
discontinuity between the nature of the highest god and the nature of the rest of 
existence that they self-consciously argued for the abrogation of the methods by 
which their own teachers and traditions had understood that god.
Yet neither man gave up the premise that there was some type of contact 
between the material world and the divine world. As the highest being was philo-
sophically removed from communication with existence, angels were elevated to 
maintain the possibility of contact between the remainder of the divine world and 
humanity, and even to manage that contact. For Proclus, angels were necessarily 
lacking in evil, because they kept contact with the multiple gods below the One, 
interpreting and conveying knowledge of them to the order below. As he argued, 
“the class that is the interpreter of the gods stands in continuity with the gods, 
knows the intellect of the gods, and reveals the divine will.” Th at class “is nothing 
other than the good proceeding and shining forth fi rst from the beings which 
remain inside the One.”8At the same time, for Augustine, angels accomplished the 
visitations of God to the material world before the incarnation, executing their 
duties as a clerk would make announcements for a judge.9 Th ose angels have no 
will of their own and exist solely to enact the material appearances of the divine. In 
both cases, as the highest god was being written out of contact with humanity, 
neither writer abandoned the prospect that human beings could communicate 
with some part of the divine world. Consequently, their theories maintained that 
the quintessence of angels was that they were in contact with humanity.
Augustine and Proclus were heavy thinkers, developing philosophical theories 
of the divine, but even late ancient readers unengaged in philosophy had resources 
by which they could arrive at much the same conclusions about angels; the most 
accessible of these resources were the narratives that I discussed at the start of this 
chapter. Reading a narrative is an act of the imagination, which forces a reader to 
entertain the possibilities that the characters of the text are compatible enough to 
exist in the same space and perhaps to communicate. In this way, any act of read-
ing is an instance of cultural training, porting its own philosophical and epistemo-
logical lessons, implicit though they may be. To understand how and what reading 
teaches, consider what a reader could learn from a simple dialogue. What follows 
is an exchange between Mary, the woman about to become the mother of Jesus, 
and Gabriel, an angel who comes to announce to her the events that will happen to 
her (Luke 1:28–38, New Revised Standard Version):
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122    Ellen Muehlberger
And he came to her and said, “Greetings, favored one! Th e Lord is with you.” But she 
was much perplexed by his words and pondered what sort of greeting this might be. 
Th e angel said to her, “Do not be afraid, Mary, for you have found favor with God. 
And now, you will conceive in your womb and bear a son, and you will name him 
Jesus. He will be great, and will be called the Son of the Most High, and the Lord God 
will give to him the throne of his ancestor David. He will reign over the house of 
Jacob forever, and of his kingdom there will be no end.” Mary said to the angel, “How 
can this be, since I am a virgin?” Th e angel said to her, “Th e Holy Spirit will come 
upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you; therefore the child 
to be born will be holy; he will be called Son of God. And now, your relative Eliza-
beth in her old age has also conceived a son; and this is the sixth month for her who 
was said to be barren. For nothing will be impossible with God.” Th en Mary said, 
“Here am I, the servant of the Lord; let it be with me according to your word.” Th en 
the angel departed from her.
Th ough this story originated in the late fi rst century, it was circulated and reimag-
ined extensively in late antiquity, entering late ancient discourse, especially Chris-
tian discourse, again and again: in texts that situated it and other Christian stories 
from the New Testament gospels with respect to Jews and Jewish religious culture; 
in explorations of the Holy Spirit and its place in the Trinity; in homilies refl ecting 
on the birth of Christ; in discussions about and advice to virgins; as a lens for 
interpreting older stories of announcement from the Old Testament; and, of 
course, in commentaries on the gospel of Luke itself.10 What does not immediately 
stand out but does come gradually to impose on the reader is the fact that Mary 
and Gabriel are engaged in a conversation. Th ey exchange greetings; they size up 
each other’s responses; they respond to likely but unstated emotional responses of 
their interlocutor. Th ey possess common communication skills; to verge toward 
the technical for a moment, those skills depend on the ability of each to hold a 
theory of mind for the other. Mary has a theory of mind for Gabriel, estimating 
that when she asks him about what seems an impossible situation he will compre-
hend and answer her question. But Gabriel also holds theory of mind for Mary, for 
as the story narrates, he sees her reaction to his appearance, understands what it 
means, and takes the initiative to reassure her: “Do not be afraid.” Th ough it was 
an extremely popular story in late antiquity, readers rarely subjected its characters 
to the same kinds of interpretive adjustments that, say, Augustine applied to 
appearances of God. Readers of the gospel of Luke—and there were many—
engaged in worldmaking when they read the text, representing to themselves a 
realm in which productive, emotionally complex contact between human beings 
and angels was possible, even expected.
Angels in this realm of contact followed the logic of interaction with beings in 
the material world, even if they did not always follow the normal expectations for 
the human capacity for action in the material world. Th ough the angel comes to 
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Mary with miraculous news, he delivers it in a regular, if frightening, conversation, 
an exchange whose development nevertheless follows the rules of more normal 
conversation. Even in the miraculous stories that I recounted at the start of the 
chapter, angels do extraordinary things. Th ey accomplish those things that human 
beings could be able to do were they only powerful enough: the monk could cross 
the river if only he were not hampered by his code of conduct; the monastic leader 
could have discovered the secrets of his monks were decorum not an issue. I mean 
to say that angels do not appear in late ancient texts in order to accomplish truly 
unimaginable acts or introduce truly novel situations. Th eir actions were surpris-
ing but not incomprehensible; their motivations were legible to others—both to 
the other characters in their own narrative contexts and to the readers who 
engaged these stories. Indeed, angels produce acts that meet expectations in most 
cases yet exceed or defy them in one or two aspects.11 As I mentioned above, this 
limited exceptionalism may signal to the skeptical reader nothing more than the 
convenience of angels as plot devices, but the consistent inclusion of angels in nar-
rative in reality reinforces how truly normal angels are to late ancient readers in 
their abnormality. Perhaps the best indication of their normality is the consistent 
application of moral evaluation to angels: Proclus, Augustine, and other late 
ancient thinkers judged angels in moral terms, drawing a boundary between evil 
angels and good ones. By including them both in the logic of interaction and in the 
expectations of interaction that obtain among human beings, such intellectual 
projects signal that the nature of angels was understood to be quite close to that of 
humanity.
In certain instances, angels were not just close to humanity; they were expected 
to interact with human beings immediately, by voicing their words inside the 
minds of human beings. Magical texts oft en point to this expectation. For exam-
ple, consider this spell for garnering a companion angel, which is preserved in a 
Greek magical papyrus. It ensured the person who executed the spell a guide and 
guaranteed that no observer could tell the diff erence between the benefi ciary of 
the spell and the angel he had gotten to direct him:12
When you go abroad, he will go abroad with you; when you are destitute, he will give 
you money. He will tell you what things will happen both when and at what time of 
the night or day. And if anyone asks you “What do I have in mind?” or “What has 
happened to me?” or even “What is going to happen?” question the angel, and he will 
tell you in silence. But you will speak to the one who questions you as if from yourself.
Identifi ed as a “mighty angel,” this guide meant safety and fi nancial security for the 
one who conjured it, but it also meant knowledge of the future, mind-reading 
abilities, and, perhaps best of all, no way for others to detect its presence. Th e con-
jurer would naturally seem to have the abilities that in reality were the result of the 
angel’s help. More important, although we may assume that an angel got by magic 
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124    Ellen Muehlberger
would then assist with one or two discrete acts of more magic, it appears that this 
is not the case with the “mighty angel” garnered by this spell. Instead, the intent of 
the spell is to acquire, seemingly permanently, such a personal guide, seer of the 
future, and internal helper as we all might want. Whether the spell was successful 
or not is immaterial, because even simply reading the spell taught a reader that 
angelic companions existed to be harnessed. And consulters of spells were only 
one of many groups to hold this expectation; personal angelic companions were a 
regular, if infrequent, topic in certain types of Christian literature. Evagrius of 
Pontus, for instance, was part of a tradition that considered angels a normal part 
of the program of ascetic advancement for monks.13 Angels were assets to those 
attempting the diffi  cult practices that Evagrius taught his students. In his treatise 
On Prayer, Evagrius describes how an angel can, “with a single word, [put] an end 
to every opposing activity within us.” Its presence “moves the light of the mind to 
an unerring activity,” so that “the mind stands thereaft er free of all turmoil, acedia, 
and negligence.”14 Angels could communicate so closely as to incline the mind 
toward certain dispositions and could meld with one’s desires in order to reveal all 
the answers a human being could ever wish to know, from the motivations of oth-
ers to the events of the future.
Th ese moments of communication between angelic and human subjectivities 
signal a peculiar late ancient assumption, namely that the two species, though dif-
ferent, were psychologically similar. Evagrius’s theory of the deep compatibility 
between the two is the most detailed and precise late ancient evidence for this 
assumption: during his time as an ascetic, Evagrius elaborated a complex working 
theory of the common psychological constitution of angels and of human beings—
and of demons, for that matter. All these were rational beings, having the faculty 
of the intellect in common; what distinguished them from one another was the 
peculiar mixture of other components; angels were predominantly composed of 
intellect, whereas human beings were less so, yet their practices of fending away 
the passions helped them cultivate their intellect.15 For Evagrius in particular, 
angels were capable of immediate congress with the human mind because of their 
sympathy to the human intellect, a faculty that they shared with humanity. Angels 
could communicate directly with human beings and could even seem to speak 
inside human minds, then, because they were of one kind with and continued to 
share a basic nature with humanity.
Other writers were more cautious, positing a close similarity between angels 
and humanity only in the distant past or the distant future. Christian thinkers who 
narrated the origins of the cosmos oft en aimed to explain the contemporary state 
of humanity, and their explanations oft en hinted at the latent potential within 
humanity either to have been or to have become something else. Gregory of Nys-
sa’s treatise On the Making of Humanity, written in the late 370s c.e., argued that 
God originally intended human beings to participate in a rational existence like 
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Angel    125
the one that angels enjoyed. It was only aft er humanity’s disobedience became evi-
dent that human beings were changed and given passions that overrode their orig-
inally rational nature. According to Gregory, at the resurrection humanity would 
return to unity with the angels and with God.16 Whereas this version of the begin-
ning of the world suggested that the actions of humanity had precipitated the dif-
ferent statuses of angels and of human beings, still other explanations located the 
cause in the actions of angels. In contrast to Gregory, Augustine of Hippo sug-
gested that angels had received their status, diff erent from humanity both morally 
and ontologically, as a result of the choices that they exercised at the start of the 
world. Angels were currently stable in their essence and their will, never departing 
from the will of God, but this was a result only of their having not abandoned God 
when other angels did. Th at is to say, angels acquired their status only because of 
the choices they exercised, or rather did not exercise, at the beginning of time.17 
Although Gregory and Augustine gave diff erent reasons for the contemporary 
division that they posited between the nature of angels and the nature of humanity, 
they shared an understanding that there was a moment in the archaic past when 
angels and humanity were essentially similar. Put a diff erent way: many late ancient 
people, whether Christians or non-Christians, philosophers or lay readers, 
assumed that angels were in a certain sense kin to humanity. I mean not that 
ancient people included angels in their tightly conceived kinship structures but 
that they recognized angels as related familiars. Either human beings and angels 
continued to be in a close relationship, possessing psychologies similar enough to 
each other to work in concert to advance toward unity with God, or they were at 
some other point in history close, until their actions separated them and made 
them distinct in essence in the present.
ANGELS,  HUMANIT Y,  AND THE ETHICAL 
PRODUCT OF KNOWING
Th e observations that I have made in the previous section about angelic commu-
nication with humanity, and the diverse ways that late ancient Christian thinkers 
imagined congruity with angels, translate in reality to a more precise theoretical 
observation. Together they suggest that in a wide range of late ancient Christian 
discourses angels and human beings were known to occupy the same ontological 
circle. By “ontological circle” I refer to a cultural construction that comprises all 
beings whose constitutions, as defi ned by the culture they inhabit, are alike enough 
to allow communication among them. Th e members of such a circle are independ-
ent of one another; they can all exercise agency to some degree. Furthermore, 
members of the same ontological circle are not necessarily members of the same 
species as categorized by the culture in which they take shape. Th e combination of 
diff erences among members and their similarities allows for productive, even 
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126    Ellen Muehlberger
unpredictable, interactions. Indeed, the beings in any given ontological circle have 
real contact with one another; that is to say, the circle is not the precipitate of a 
thought experiment but is the set of implicit or explicit assumptions in a culture 
about the types of interaction possible among beings in the world.
Th e parameters of an ontological circle are constructed and thus vary from one 
cultural context to another. In the contemporary North American context, some 
animals share the ontological circle with human beings, particularly domestic ani-
mals. Th e theorist Donna Haraway has written extensively about the relationship 
between humanity and multiple “companion species,” operating on the assump-
tion that human beings are accompanied by, even constituted with, any number of 
other organisms, as are all other types of life.18 Haraway is one important early 
voice in a wider contemporary turn among scholars toward investigating animal-
human relationships as imagined in the products and processes of diff erent cul-
tures. Yet there are several other confi gurations of the ontological circle to be 
explored; that is to say, human beings have oft en been paired with animals in an 
ontological circle—Beth Berkowitz’s chapter in this volume is an excellent illustra-
tion of the complex negotiations that such pairings can inspire—and yet other 
cultural contexts have included other types of nonanimal agents among the actors 
in the ontological circle: agents who were immaterial, or artifi cial, or alien.19 In all 
these cases, what is common is this: existing as members of the same circle with 
other beings holds the promise of transformation, the potential of surpassing the 
capacity of any individual member or even kind, as well as the threat of unforeseen 
consequences of interaction. As a logical result, part of a culture’s construction of 
its circle is the development of rules about how to manage contact among mem-
bers, especially members otherwise thought to be of diff erent kinds. Th e exchange 
between members is therefore oft en culturally regulated in an intense way, to 
the point that the transfer of certain kinds of information among members—a 
natural eventuality of the communication common to members of the same cir-
cle—and even physical contact, especially sexual contact, are problematized. 
Indeed, the persistence of explicit rules about contact with other beings in a cul-
ture can oft en signal the implicit assumption of an ontological circle, in that such 
rules necessarily imagine both that the contact is possible and that such contact is 
not under the full control of the human member. Insistent talk about other species, 
especially about the types of contact that are taboo, is as much a negative marker 
of the existence of an assumed ontological circle as the positing of the possibility 
of communication is a positive one. In late antiquity, for example, tales about 
angels and their interaction with humanity warned about the corruptive potential 
of the knowledge that they shared and the moral consequences of sexual contact 
with them.20 Th ose specifi c late ancient contexts in which angels were assumed to 
be likely to come into contact with human beings were oft en fl ush with instruc-
tions about how to deal with angelic visitors. Th e resulting structures harnessed 
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the power of interactions, now guarded, among members. For late ancient people, 
meaningful contact with angels was unpredictable in its outcomes yet oft en pro-
ductive, resulting in new cultural forms. Understanding that angels existed in the 
same ontological circle as human beings in much of late ancient culture allows us 
to understand the transformative potential latent in the contact between them.
When taken as members of the same ontological circle as human beings, angels 
introduce their own capacities into the fi eld of potential from which all in the cir-
cle may draw. For instance, in the stories that I shared at the start of this chapter, 
angels accomplished miraculous things, creating situations and results that had 
remained out of the reach of the human actors in their midst. Yet the promise of 
sharing the ontological circle with angels extended further, bearing the suggestion 
that some aspects of angelic existence could also obtain for others in the circle. We 
know, for example, that late ancient Christians assumed that angels had an exten-
sive capacity for vision, one that outstripped the human faculty of sight. Th ey were 
capable of seeing other divine beings, which human beings could not see.21 Given 
how closely angels and humanity were held to be related, it is not surprising that 
this widespread assumption about angelic vision led to deliberate exploration of 
what such sensibilities meant for humanity. A collection of homilies from late 
ancient Syria, now identifi ed with the single author Pseudo-Macarius, explored 
the latent potential of angelic visual acuity. For this homilist, Ezekiel’s vision of the 
special angels known as cherubim was the fodder for an entire discussion of the 
nature of angels, which was completely visual: angels were “entirely eye,” or 
“entirely vision.” He urged readers to understand this fact not just as a distinctive 
feature of the angelic class but as a trace that pointed toward a real transformation 
available also to them. Speaking directly to the most advanced religious practition-
ers, he explained: “When you become a throne of God and the heavenly charioteer 
has mounted you, and your whole soul has become a spiritual eye, . . . then you too 
are a living being.”22 Th e constitution of human beings was close enough to angels’ 
that human beings might become like them, gaining the sensibilities that angels 
already possessed. Being part of the same ontological circle as angels, then, allowed 
writers like Pseudo-Macarius to imagine how they might extend normal human 
faculties to develop in new, unpredicted ways. Th e expansion of human possibili-
ties—in this case, of vision, or of developing the intellect, or of someday returning 
to the unity of rational thought that God originally designed—all these are possi-
ble only if humanity is ontologically contiguous with angels, in contact with them. 
We need to be meaningfully like those other beings that we interact with for the 
promise of angelic transformation to be real.
While contiguity among members is the foundation of ideas that expand the 
potential of members of the same ontological circle, at the same time it means that 
actions taken among the members have consequences. Being part of an ontologi-
cal circle means being exposed to the ideas and infl uences of the other members. 
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As I have mentioned, the possibilities that such a state brings are also paired with 
dangers; those dangers exist because the mores and motivations of the others in 
one’s ontological circle are not always well known. As nonhuman beings, angels 
work by their own unpredictable processes. On the one hand, this is just a logical 
observation: if angels worked and acted like human beings, they would be human 
beings. But on the other, there is evidence from antiquity to prove that ignorance 
of the nature of angels was an assumption commonly voiced in late ancient dis-
course—that it was historically a part of late ancient knowledge of angels. For each 
late ancient thinker who tried to describe angelic vision, angelic appearances, 
angelic creation, or angelic morality, there was another who simply threw up his 
hands and admitted ignorance with respect to angels, their abilities, and their 
motivations.23
Even that ignorance, though, was culturally productive. If I am right that Chris-
tians considered themselves part of the same ontological circle as angels, and if 
they regularly refl ected on how much they did not know about angels, then late 
ancient Christian culture as a whole entertained two seemingly opposite ideas: 
that angels were like human beings and that angels could act in ways and produce 
things radically diff erent from how humans acted and what humans could pro-
duce. Let me put this point in visual terms by describing the ontological circle for 
a moment as a physical shape in which all members stand side by side. Ignorance 
about angels and their abilities created a perspective in which the Christian stood 
in an exceptionally large ontological circle with other beings, yet the complete 
contours of that circle, especially the distant place where the curves of the circle 
joined to form the whole, were hidden from him. In theory, the circle is complete, 
but in practice much of it exists over the horizon, hidden from view, so that the 
eff ect is not so much a circle of known beings but an open-ended curve in which 
some members can be imagined but must necessarily remain unknown in their 
basic essence.24 I speculate that this quality underlies the intensity that infuses talk 
of communication among members of the circle—it is at once exhilarating and 
frightening to think oneself part of a group some of whose members are partly or 
entirely obscure in their existence and essence. Simply thinking of diff erent kinds 
of beings with whom one may interact lacks the charge that characterizes descrip-
tions in late antique literature of meetings between angels and human beings. 
Knowing as late ancient people did that there are beings like you whose nature 
remains mysterious, truly incomprehensible, is transformative in a way that no 
thought experiment could ever be.
Th e proof of my claim lies with the evidence from late antiquity detailing the 
role of angels as messengers. Th e Greek word angelos meant “messenger,” and 
many angelic visitors to humanity were understood to be passing information. 
Gabriel, for example, when he appeared to Mary, was there to inform her; his 
visit did not induce or change her situation. In some parts of late ancient 
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culture, this function of angels dominated. Late ancient Christians in particular 
began to write about angels as permanent channels of illumination and knowl-
edge, tethering the divine world to the material through a series of interlocking 
levels of existence, each capable of being in contact only with the levels adjacent to 
it. In fi gurations like that created in Pseudo-Dionysius’s Celestial Hierarchy, angels 
were ordered by their closeness to God and vesseled knowledge in sequence 
among themselves, from highest to lowest, and from the lowest angel to the most 
advanced human beings. Understanding angels as divine messengers in this way, 
messengers that can fi lter and channel information from two discontinuous 
realms, has extensive practical and cultural ramifi cations.
As late antiquity progressed, however, the most signifi cant purpose of angelic 
visits shift ed from conveying information to impelling human beings to write new 
narratives. Two examples from late ancient monastic culture illustrate the change. 
Sometime in the fourth century, a man named Pachomius received a text from an 
angel, along with a set of instructions:25
One time when he was sitting in his cave an angel appeared to him and told him: “So 
far as you are concerned, you conduct your life perfectly. It is in vain for you to con-
tinue sitting in your cave! Come now, leave this place, and go out, and call the young 
monks together, and dwell with them. Rule them by the model that I am now giving 
you.” And the angel gave him a bronze tablet on which [the following rule] was 
engraved.
Th e angel gave Pachomius a message, but he also insisted that Pachomius begin to 
institute a community governed both by his authority and by the authority of the 
rule granted to him. According to this text, the beginning of the Pachomian fed-
eration, a large but loose association of monastic communities, can be traced to a 
prodding angel whose delivery of a communiqué was both direct and directive. 
Pachomius’s experience was repeated: Th ere is evidence that Shenoute of Atripe, 
the leader of the White Monastery, also received instruction from an angel to write 
a rule and to gather monks. Th e document in which Shenoute meets his messenger 
is badly damaged, but it appears to have an angel speaking directly to Shenoute, 
saying, “Write! Write!”26 And write Shenoute did—his collected works reveal the 
intimate details of the community that he founded, both through rules that he 
instituted proscribing behavior and through accounts of punishments that he 
ordained. Both Pachomius and Shenoute headed monasteries or federations of 
monasteries that were remarkably large in their late ancient contexts, with popula-
tions in the thousands. Beyond their absolute numbers, though, the communities 
that these men founded bore quite an infl uence on subsequent expressions of 
Christian monasticism.27 Th e monastic systems that these men created changed the 
landscape of Upper Egypt, remaking the world in which the men and women who 
joined their federations lived and the villages that supported their communities.28 
<i>Late Ancient Knowing : Explorations in Intellectual History</i>, edited by Catherine M. Chin, and Moulie Vidas,
         University of California Press, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=1882082.


































130    Ellen Muehlberger
Th at is to say, angels not only came with messages but in these cases inspired the 
composition of new texts; and with those new texts, oft en elaborate, came the crea-
tion of entire ethical systems, new habitats in which new human endeavors could 
fl ourish.
One more example will make plain the transformative potential of this way of 
envisioning interaction between angels and human beings. It is diffi  cult to think of 
a late ancient event with larger cultural consequences than the meeting of the 
angel Jibril with Muhammad.29 Jibril, the faithful spirit, pressed Muhammad to 
recite messages that he had been receiving; Muhammad began to recite and in so 
doing began the project of revealing the Qur‘an to humanity. Th is account appears 
in some forms in the Qur‘an itself, in other forms in the hadith collections, those 
accumulated traditions reported about Muhammad by his close companions. In 
the Qur‘an, a discussion of the prophet’s authority in Surah 6 makes it clear that 
the revelation of the Qur‘an was not simply a matter of Jibril’s delivering a previ-
ously composed message from God. Rather, it was a collaboration between the 
angel and the human being. Muhammad was a necessary actor in the Qur‘an’s 
inception: a piece of paper conveying the details of God’s will or an angel speaking 
them would not have worked.30 Th e result of the collaboration between Jibril and 
Muhammad was, like the Rules of Pachomius and the Canons of Shenoute, adopted 
by an early community of believers as an important document, one that held open 
a new way of being, something unprecedented and thus requiring careful preser-
vation. Th at is because the Qur‘an, like the Rules of Pachomius and the Canons of 
Shenoute, lent itself as a divine scaff old for the enactment of a creative discourse of 
instructions for living. All these angelic products were ethical documents that 
encouraged the formation and continuation of ethical communities, in turn 
anchored in the authority of their message. Th is is my observation—that the pres-
ence of angels in the ontological circle of human beings creates new, unpredicted, 
and pluripotent options for living for all who are in the circle.
Yet it seems that at least some late ancient people reached the same conclusion. 
Let me close by citing a story that circulated about Muhammad and his under-
standing of his experience with the angel. Among the ahadith collected in the ninth 
century by the Iranian scholar Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj is a vignette about a second 
visit by Jibril, this time to a group of people. Muhammad and several friends were 
approached by a man in white clothing and with raven hair—a stranger, whom 
none of them recognized, yet whose body and appearance showed none of the 
usual wear and tear to indicate that he was a traveler. Familiar yet alien, he quizzed 
the prophet about several topics: about submission, about faith, about beauty, 
about judgment. Muhammad patiently and piously answered his questions. Th e 
questioner left , and aft er a while Muhammad asked his close friend Umar: “Do you 
know who that was?” Umar demurred, and Muhammad said: “Th at was Jibril. He 
came to teach you your religion.”31 Th is story, the hadith of Jibril, is oft en presented 
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in pious Islamic sources as the only hadith that one needs to know. It tells us what 
we need to know about how angels were conceived of in late antiquity and about 
the deep eff ects of their being considered to exist in the same ontological circle as 
human beings. Whereas in the narrative setting of the fi rst century Gabriel appeared 
to Mary to deliver a bit of news and to prepare her for her experiences, Jibril, 
understood within the parameters of late ancient knowledge about angels, came to 
Muhammad to force him to recite a new plan for humanity. Th eir work together 
was at once conservative, recalling humanity to an original message from God, and 
creative at the same time, in that it gave voice to a new cultural form in which 
human beings could exist and could relate to the divine.
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